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One of the main problems of large firms is that theytend to lose their entrepreneurial orientation (EO)once they have grown.The launch of corporate ven-
tures (CV) has been adopted by managers, and studied by
scholars, as the means to create new businesses within
large companies with a low level of EO. Extensive research
on CV has been carried out to understand how these proj-
ects can effectively lead to new business creation. However,
there are no studies on the effect of CV projects on new
business creation after the project has ended. More specifi-
cally, scholars have overlooked the prospect that a CV proj-
ect may continue to  influence new business creation  and
how this is possible. This article explores how CV projects
have an effect on new business creation after they end, if
any.The discussion builds on the analysis of the case study
of Riso Gallo, an Italian company operating in the rice
industry, which developed a CV project between 1988 and
1996 to sidestep a poor EO.
The study of firm-level entrepreneurship, or corporate
entrepreneurship (CE), is increasingly central in managerial
studies (Dess et al. 2003). CE expresses the entrepreneurial
behavior shown by existing organizations that create a new
business, here intended as developing a new product, enter-
ing a new market or both (Sathe 2003).This behavior could
encompass innovation, which means introducing some-
thing new to the marketplace (Sharma and Chrisman 1999).
CE is one of the main issues in management studies, and
much research has been carried out on identifying determi-
nants and outcomes of this phenomenon (e.g., Barringer
and Bluedorn 1999; Burgelman 1983, 1984; Guth and
Ginsberg 1990; Jennings and Lumpkin 1989; Kanter 1985;
Kuratko, Montagno, and Hornsby 1990; Miller 1983;
Stevenson and Gumpert 1985; Zahra 1991, 1993). Such a
wide research concern is due to the fact that, as a result of
globalization, market uncertainty, and new technology, com-
panies need to be very responsive, flexible, and agile (Sauer
and Ruddle 2006).
In the field of CE, much research has been done on EO
(e.g., Covin and Slevin 1988, 1989, 1991; Lumpkin and Dess
1996; Rauch et al. 2004, Wiklund 1999; Wiklund and
Shepherd 2003). EO is a strategic orientation characterized
by a tendency to seek product-market innovation as a
source of competitive advantage, a proactive posture in
seeking change, and a moderate propensity to take risk
(Miller and Friesen 1982). One of the main problems of
large firms is that they tend to loose their EO once they
have grown; thus the generation and sustainment of entre-
preneurship in established companies is one of the main
issues in management studies and practices.The launch of
Corporate Ventures (CV) has been adopted by managers,
and studied by scholars, as the means to create new busi-
nesses within large companies with a low level of EO. CV
refers to “corporate entrepreneurial efforts that lead to the
creation of new business organizations within the corpo-
rate organization” (Sharma and Chrisman 1999: 19). Exten-
sive research on CV has been carried out to understand
how these projects can effectively lead to new business cre-
ation (e.g., Block and MacMillan 1993; Burgelman 1983;
Campbell et al. 2003; Chesbrough 2000; Kanter 1985, 1989;
Kanter and Richardson 1991).
However, no studies exist on the effect of CV projects on
new business creation after the project has ended. More
specifically, scholars have overlooked the prospect that  a
CV project may continue to  influence new business cre-
ation  and how this is possible.
This study explores how CV projects have an effect on
new business creation after they end.The discussion builds
on the analysis of the case study of Riso Gallo, an Italian
company operating in the rice industry. Riso Gallo devel-
oped a CV project between 1988 and 1996 to sidestep a
poor EO.
The article offers a new way of thinking about the rela-
tionships between the concepts of new business creation,
EO and CV, showing how CV projects not only have the
main intended effect of allowing the company to create
new businesses in the short run, but also have a collateral
emergent effect in influencing new business creation after
their end through the sustainment of parent company EO.
This effect is made possible by the activation of an organi-
zational learning process within the parent company. This
learning process is oriented to the development of integra-
tive, rather than technical, knowledge.
This article begins with a literature review on EO and CV
to highlight the research gap and to develop the research
question. It is followed by a methodological section, where
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the research design, data collection, and data analysis are
presented.The next section is devoted to the case study dis-
cussion with the lenses of EO and CV literature.The article
concludes by discussing main findings, contributions, and
possible future development of this study.
Theoretical Review
Research into the nature, antecedents, and effects of CE, here
intended as new business creation within established organ-
izations (Sathe 2003), has been rapidly growing during the
last two decades (Ferreira 2001).Despite the development of
the field, evidence supports the fact that scholars have not
been consistent in attaching a label to the phenomenon they
purport to study (Wiklund 1998). Labels such as entrepre-
neurship (Miller 1983), corporate entrepreneurship (Zahra
1991; Zahra and Covin, 1995), intrapreneurship (Kuratko et
al. 1993; Kuratko, Montagno, and Hornsby 1990; Pinchot
1985), entrepreneurial posture (Covin and Slevin 1991),
entrepreneurial intensity (Morris and Sexton 1996), and
entrepreneurial orientation (Lumpkin and Dess 1996) have
been used. Different labels have often been used to describe
similar phenomena, and different concepts have been
expressed with the same word. This section aims to clarify
such a terminological confusion through the definition of the
key concepts of this study: EO and CV. The literature review
on the two concepts will highlight the research gap to be
addressed.
Entrepreneurial Orientation
The construct EO is receiving increased attention in the field
of entrepreneurship, as it is believed to be at the heart of
entrepreneurial strategy making (Dess, Lumpkin, and Covin
1997). EO is a type of strategic orientation. Strategic orienta-
tions are underlying philosophies that support the overall
decision-making process and create an internal environment
in which desired behaviors are supported and encouraged
(Miles and Arnold 1991). In other words, strategic orientation
is the business dimension that describes the factors driving
the firm’s formulation of strategy. Miller and Friesen (1982)
identified two types of strategic orientations (or strategic
postures): conservative and entrepreneurial. The conserva-
tive posture leads companies to pursue innovation only
reluctantly, tending to emphasize existing routines and to for-
mulate strategy driven by currently controlled resources
(Stevenson and Gumpert 1985).Strategy in the entrepreneur-
ial posture, on the contrary, is characterized by a tendency to
seek product-market innovation as a source of competitive
advantage, a proactive posture in seeking change, and a mod-
erate propensity to take risk.A company is characterized by
an EO when the firm’s formulation of strategy is driven by
the perception of opportunities (Stevenson and Gumpert
1985).
Thus EO is a multidimensional construct encompassing
firm innovativeness, proactiveness, and risk taking.
Innovativeness refers to the supportive tendency toward
new ideas, novelty, experimentation, and creative processes,
while departing from established practice (Lumpkin and
Dess 1996); proactiveness is the propensity to anticipate and
act on future market needs (Lumpkin and Dess 1996); risk
taking is the willingness to commit large amounts of
resources to projects characterized by highly uncertain out-
comes (Miller and Friesen 1982).
We stress the difference between CE and EO. CE is a
behavior, the content of the strategic choice (i.e., new busi-
ness creation). EO is instead a determinant of CE: if high, it
leads to new business creation. Such a distinction is still not
clear in literature (Wiklund 1998), where the two concepts
are often confused: several authors make reference to CE
when they study EO. In fact, EO is difficult to measure; this
explains why EO is usually measured by observing entrepre-
neurial behavior.
A company EO mirrors Stevenson and Jarillo’s (1990) con-
cept of entrepreneurial management, as “it reflects the organi-
zational processes, methods and styles that firms use to act
entrepreneurially” (Lumpkin and Dess 1996: 139).They shape
a firm’s overall capability to act in an entrepreneurial way, get-
ting organizational members to create change and develop
something new. This means that indicators of EO are those
organizational features (structure and processes) helping orga-
nizational members to spot entrepreneurial opportunities.
Perhaps the most recurrent theme among scholars inter-
ested in EO concerns its positive implications on firm growth
and performance (Dess, Lumpkin, and Covin 1997; Wiklund
1998; Zahra, Jennings, and Kuratko 1999). Indeed, EO is
regarded as the sine qua non of firms that seek to succeed
in today’s volatile and extremely dynamic business environ-
ment (Wiklund and Shepherd 2003). Innovativeness, in its
double form of product-market innovation and technological
innovation, is an important component of firm competitive-
ness and success,as it represents a fundamental way for firms
to pursue new opportunities (Lumpkin and Dess 1996).The
firms’ ability to seize and act on opportunities (proactive-
ness) has positive performance implications (i.e., first mover
advantage; Barringer and Bluedorn 1999). In today’s uncer-
tain environment, managerial support for risk-taking strate-
gies has proven successful, especially in the long run
(Wiklund and Shepherd 2003).
Corporate Venturing
All the major companies have been entrepreneurially orient-
ed at the beginning of their life cycle; however, as a start-up
grows and matures, administrative practices suffocate the EO
of the company. CV practices are often introduced to allow
the company to be innovative in spite of a clear deficiency in
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EO.To use a metaphor, if entrepreneurship is the “heart” of a
company,CV has been often used as a “bypass”that can make
the company innovative despite a loss of EO. The need for
such a bypass was already indicated by Drucker in 1974:“The
search for innovation needs to be organizationally separate
and outside of the ongoing managerial business. […] One
cannot simultaneously create the new and take care of what
one already has” (p. 799).
CV refers to “corporate entrepreneurial efforts that lead to
the creation of new business organizations within the corpo-
rate organization” (Sharma and Chrisman 1999: 19).
According to Block and MacMillan (1993), a project is a CV
when it (1) involves an activity new to the organization, (2)
is initiated or conducted internally, (3) involves significantly
higher risk of failure or losses, (4) is characterized by high
uncertainty, (5) will be managed separately at some time dur-
ing its life, and (6) is undertaken for the purpose of increas-
ing sales, profit, productivity, or quality.The outcome of a CV
project consists in the development of “newstreams” (Kanter
1989), new areas of activities able to generate new flows of
revenues, additional to the revenues generated by the “main-
streams,” or current areas of activities.
CV can be classified either as external or internal. External
CV refers to “corporate venturing activities that result in the
creation of semiautonomous or autonomous organizational
entities that reside outside the existing organizational
domain” (Sharma and Chrisman 1999: 19). Internal CV refers
to “corporate venturing activities that result in the creation of
organizational entities that reside within an existing organiza-
tional domain” (Sharma and Chrisman 1999: 20).
According to Kanter and Richardson (1991) four different
types of CV programs can be identified: the “pure venture
capital model,” which invests in companies started outside
the parent company; the “new venture development incuba-
tor,” which manages ventures as independent entities,
spawned either internally or externally; the “idea creation
and transfer center,”which develops “newstreams”but passes
them on to established operations to exploit; and the
“employee project model,” a more entrepreneurial variant of
employee involvement or suggestion programs.
As reported by Block and MacMillan (1993), in the 1960s
and early 1970s, 25 percent of the Fortune 500 companies
had a CV program. They were largely disbanded during the
late 1970s. In the first half of the 1980s,corporations renewed
their interest in CV and lost it again in the 1990s (Chesbrough
2000). During the dot-com boom, many large firms turned to
CV, as in the cases of Ericsson, Nokia, Intel, Roche, Marks, and
Spencer.According to Campbell et al. (2003), CV investment
levels fell by 75 percent between 1999 and 2003, and many
venturing units closed down,witnessing the existence of kind
of “CV life cycle.” This contradicting history behind CV has
made his study fascinating and challenging.
Research on CV has been carried out largely to understand
the main factors determining the success of this kind of proj-
ect, therefore adopting the venture perspective. Roles and
activities have been studied within CV projects to identify
those factors influencing the success of the process (see
Burgelman 1983; Block and MacMillan 1993; Kanter 1985,
1989 as main studies).As a result of research activities, sever-
al business cases have been developed—mainly at Harvard
Business School—and adopted within management courses
all over the world (see Bouchard 2002 for an extensive
review): Bell, Lucent Technologies, Nokia, Polaroid, Procter
and Gamble, SAS, Siemens Nixdorf, 3M, and Xerox are some
of the best known. Literature has remained on a descriptive
and teaching level, mainly transferring to  readers the experi-
ence of these large corporations in CV. More interest in the
topic has recently been generated by publishing the research
results of two projects carried out respectively by Harvard
Business School (Shulman and Stallkamp 2004) and London
Business School (Campbell et al. 2003).
Despite the extensive literature, research so far has not
explored the effect of CV on future business creation once
the CV projects have ended. Thus the following research
question is posed: “How can corporate venturing projects
affect new business creation after they end, if at all?”
The remainder of this article addresses this question, pre-
senting the results of a case study.
Methodology
Complying with the nature of our research question and the
aim of the article, the research design of this study relies on
a case study approach (Eisenhardt 1989;Yin 1989),according
to which several methods and empirical sources contribute
to offer a holistic understanding of the phenomenon. The
time span of the present study is 1980–2004. The overall
design of the research is anchored around the study of three
periods in the history of Riso Gallo: (1) up to the launch of
the CV project called “Naturis” (1988); (2) the period
between the launch and the end of the CV project
(1988–1996); (3) after the end of the CV project (1996
onwards).The point of studying a set of periods longitudinal-
ly in time (Pettigrew 1979) is that they provide a transparent
look at the evolution of the phenomenon of interest. For
each period, we checked for triangulation of different data
sources to obtain more robust evidence (Jick 1979).
The data collection process started in May 2002, with a
retrospective data collection from 1980 to 2002. Data
sources are reported in Table 1. Primary sources included
semistructured interviews with the top management of Riso
Gallo and Naturis.Nine interviews were conducted for a total
of 18 interview-hours. Direct observation complemented
data collected through interviews. Secondary sources includ-
ed artifacts and documents from Riso Gallo and Naturis
EXPLORING THE EFFECTS OF CORPORATE VENTURING ON NEW BUSINESS CREATION 15
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I. Primary Data
I. a. Interviews
1 – Mario Preve, Riso Gallo President (1 interview, 2 hours)
2 – Cesare Preve, Naturis President (2 interviews, 2 hours)
3 – Flor Piepp Romero, Naturis R&D Manager (1 interview, 2
hours)
4 – Nicoletta Balladore, Naturis Area Manager (1 interview, 2
hours)
5 – Daniele Bellucco, Naturis Accounting and Logistic Manager
(1 interview, 2 hours)
6 – Claudio Carriere, Naturis Production Manager (1 interview, 2
hours)
7 – Francesco Rocchi, Naturis Managing Director (2 interviews,
2 hours)
I. b. Direct Observation
1 – Factory tour: Robbio plant, Riso Gallo office
2 – Factory tour: Rovigo plant, Naturis offices 
3 – Personal contacts: Mario and Cesare Preve, outside the
research setting
II. Secondary Data
II. a. Balance Sheets
1 – Riso Gallo Balance Sheets (1997–2003)  
2 – Naturis Balance Sheets (1997–2003)
II. b. Data on the rice industry
1 – Market survey on rice consumption in Italy (“Indagine inte-
grata sul consumo di riso in Italia”), carried out by Enterisi,
February 2001
2 – Rice: evolution of the market and its perspectives (“Riso:
evoluzione di mercato e sue prospettive”), carried out by
Enterisi, 29th October 2002
3 – Analysis of the Italian market of rice (June/July, 2003), carried
out by Enterisi, August 2002
II. c. Internal reports
1 – Naturis budget 2004
2 – Naturis – “From quick cooking rice to innovative food ingre-
dients,” (Description of the evolution of Naturis strategy),
June 2003
3 – Naturis marketing mix (strategic guidelines for marketing
activities)
II. d. Websites
1 – www.naturis.it 
2 – www.risogallo.it 
3 – www.riviana.com 
4 – www.riceweb.org (International Rice Research Institute)
5 – www.enterisi.it 
II. e. Press releases
1 – Riso Gallo press release, 2001–2003
2 – Naturis press release, 2001–2003
II. f. Articles in newspapers and magazines
1 – “Riso Gallo: un anno di novità per il leader del mercato
risiero” – Largo Consumo, October 1995
2 – “Riso Gallo” – Largo Consumo, October 1996
3 – “Sementi fatte in casa” – Il Sole 24 Ore, January 1997
4 – “Riso Gallo, il piatto si fa più ricco” – Il Sole 24 Ore, January
1997
5 – “La Riso Gallo riscopre le antiche varietà cinesi” – Il Sole 24
Ore, October 1999
6 – “Riso Gallo innova il mercato” – Mark Up,April 2000
7 – “Tutti ricchi i chicchi di F&P (Riso Gallo)” – Mark Up,
December 2000
8 – “Riso pronto senza cucinare” – Tecnologie Alimentari,
January/February 2002
9 – “Riso per ogni esigenza” – Surgelati Magazine,
January/February 2002
10 – “La cottura che tiene e il piatto già pronto” – Il Sole 24 Ore,
April 2002
11 – “I chicchiricchi della quarta generazione” – Il Sole 24 Ore,
April 2002
12 – “Riso speciale precotto per insalate” – Food Industria, May
2002
13 – “Riso pronto Naturis” – Locali Top, May 2002
14 – “Oggi l’insalata di riso si fa senza pentola” – Fuori casa, May
2002
15 – “Risò, pronto senza cottura!” – Food Machines, May/June
2002
16 – “Naturis gioca con l’acqua” – Mark up, June 2002
17 – “Il nuovo riso che rinviene in acqua fredda” – Bar Giornale,
June 2002
18 – “Pronto senza cucinare il Risò di Naturis” – AL, 9, September
2002
19 – “Arriva il riso supersprint” – Burda, October 2002
20 – “Risò, il riso facile” – Nautica, October 2002
21 – “Tecnologia naturale” – Food Machines, July/August 2003
22 – “La Naturis di Rovigo regina del disidratato” – Il Sole 24 ore,
October 2003
23 – “E io vendo riso ai Cinesi” – Panorama Economy, July 2006 
24 – “Questioni di famiglia? No, di qualità” – Economia &
Management, July–August 2006
II. g. Books
1 – G. de Felice “150 anni di chicchiricchi” – Riso Gallo S.p.A.
II. h. Pictures
1 – Photographic materials realized by Naturis Press Office and
Weber Shandwick Italia
Table 1. Case Study Data Sources
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archives, catalogs, news clippings, journal and magazine arti-
cles, books, annual reports, budgets, and plans.
Data analysis followed an interaction process between
theory and empirical evidence (Miles and Huberman 1994).
We went back and forth between data and literature to inter-
pret data collected and develop our findings. Data analysis
followed a six-stage interaction between theory and empiri-
cal evidence. In the first stage, secondary data were collected
to get a general overview of the case and evaluate its suitabil-
ity for a study on CE. In the second stage we carried out inter-
views to verify the validity of data collected. After this, we
started to analyze the relevant literature on CE with a major
focus on EO and CV, obtaining a theoretical framework for
continuing information acquisition (third stage).After a few
months we completed our information gathering process,
interviewing members of the management team of the par-
ent company (i.e., Riso Gallo) and the CV project (i.e.,
Naturis) in their operating setting, and visited the companies
for direct observation (fourth stage). Subsequently, we
engaged in an iterative process (fifth stage) in which we
went back and forth between data and literature to interpret
data through the lenses of the literature.This brought us to
the sixth stage, in which we developed a new way of think-
ing about the relationship between the concepts of new
business creation, EO and CV.
The case study is presented dividing our analysis into
three different periods:
1. Riso Gallo up to 1988;
2. Riso Gallo between 1988 and 1996: the launch of
Naturis; and
3. Riso Gallo after 1996.
Case Analysis and Discussion
Riso Gallo up to 1988 (period 1)
Riso Gallo is a well-known Italian company that employs 150
people and has been operating in the rice industry for 150
years.Today it holds the Italian market leadership thanks to a
market share of 26.2 percent that reaches a peak of 35 per-
cent in the parboiled segment. In 2004 the company
processed 120,000 tons of rice for a turnover of 100 million.
The company plays an important role in the international
market as well. Riso Gallo is part of an international group
with subsidiaries in France, Switzerland, and the UK. More
than 30 percent of Riso Gallo’s production is exported all
over the world, even to China and Japan. Riso Gallo is a fam-
ily business, run since its foundation by the Preve family.The
company CEO is Mario Preve,well known on the Italian press
for being successful in such a mature industry.
Riso Gallo started its activities producing rice, a traditional
product in the world diet.The company was founded in 1876
in Genoa.After some years it moved to the Pavia area in north-
west Italy. This area has been  well known  for its rich variety
of rice since the Middle Ages. Riso Gallo used to sell its rice
mainly in the north of Italy until the early 1950s. Then the
company gradually expanded its market in the rest of Italy
during the 1950s and the 1960s. The 1970s were character-
ized by the appointment of Mario Preve as company CEO in
1973, when he was 32 years old. Riso Gallo then had to face
the Italian market decline and this led to market expansion in
the rest of the world and to the need to develop entrepre-
neurial activities.Among the main innovations introduced by
Riso Gallo,we may mention the introduction of parboiled rice
in 1978. This kind of rice, commonly used nowadays, cooks
more quickly than the regular one and keeps its consistency
even if overcooked.These features are due to a technical treat-
ment based on boiling, evaporation, and drying.This technol-
ogy was not developed by Riso Gallo but was copied and
adopted by the company.A company supplying the U.S.Army
already produced parboiled rice in the United States.
Nevertheless, the Preve family had the vision to apply this
innovation to the  Italian domestic market, thus reducing the
common difficulties found in cooking rice properly. The
Preve family acquired the innovative technology from the
United States and started to sell parboiled rice. Nine years
later, in 1987, Riso Gallo developed this technology further
and launched “5 minutes,”a kind of rice that can be cooked in
only 5 minutes, one third of the cooking time of regular rice.
The development of the technology was carried out within
the production department, given that the company had no
specific human resources dedicated to research and develop-
ment. No formal research and development (henceforth
R&D) procedures and budget were established at that time.
To summarize, before 1988 the company EO was low,
resulting in very few new business creations based on imita-
tion (only two innovations introduced in 112 years).
The adoption of this new technology brought about a
slight growth in rice consumption, but the maturity of the
industry was still evident.There was the need to develop a
greater innovation to revitalize the market, but the manage-
ment was aware of the fact that the company did not have
the potential for that since its EO was low.
Riso Gallo between 1988 and 1996: The
Launch of Naturis (period 2)
In the following years, given the market potential for fast-
cooking rice, Riso Gallo decided to invest in this research
line. In 1998, during an international food exhibition, Mario
and Cesare Preve met Mario Gehring, a food technician, who
was exploring the potential of dehydration for fast vegetable
cooking at Puccinelli, the micro-firm he was working for. In
1998 Riso Gallo and Puccinelli decided to set up a joint ven-
ture called Naturis. It has been run since its foundation by
Cesare Preve, the brother of Riso Gallo’s CEO. A great deal of
autonomy was given to the corporate venture to develop the
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technology and apply it to rice to introduce a new product
to the market.
Naturis was conceived as being a research-oriented com-
pany,organized to be ready to spot innovation opportunities.
More precisely, Cesare Preve set up a venture characterized
by a low level of formalization, no formal rules, continuous
experimentation, and the explicit request for workers to
abandon procedures and introduce variations in their opera-
tions. Power was delegated to all the relevant players in the
company. Each person operating in Naturis was called on to
contribute to the recognition and exploitation of opportuni-
ties.The remuneration system was based on the capacity of
employees to create value: employees were rewarded for
developing new ideas.
Naturis was structured in an organic way. To expand the
possibilities of opportunity identification and to perceive any
change in the external environment, Naturis promoted the
development of a department devoted to the continuous scan-
ning of the environment and the interface with Riso Gallo.
At the same time, within Naturis, Cesare Preve acted as a
system integrator; he was involved in all the activities of the
company, thus reducing barriers between departments.
Moreover, he organized frequent, and apparently redundant,
meetings aiming at creating commitment among all the
employees. Additionally, a strong communication system was
developed: Cesare Preve imposed a system of regular informa-
tion reporting, so that everyone in the venture could be
informed about the activities taking place in other departments.
In seven years Naturis was able to develop a new product
for Riso Gallo that was launched in 1996:“Chicchi Conditi”
(flavored grains), a line of “ready to cook” risottos.This prod-
uct, which can be considered the main innovation of Riso
Gallo,consists of a box of filled rice grains that,once cooked,
turn into a perfect risotto.This means that the consumer just
has to boil the product to obtain a meal, instead of spending
time in a complicated cooking operation. The rice grain is
filled during the production process thanks to its dehydra-
tion at specific temperature and pressure conditions.
Riso Gallo was able to introduce a very innovative product
that relaunched rice consumption, opening up a brand new
“ready to cook” risotto market. This innovation offers great
value-added to consumers, allowing them to create a risotto
more easily than ever before. The launch of this innovation
was made possible thanks to the development of Naturis, a
CV project that allowed Riso Gallo to create a new business
despite a low level of EO.
Riso Gallo after 1996 (period 3)
Riso Gallo ended its CV project at the beginning of 1996,
when Naturis became independent and was sold to Cesare
Preve. Naturis, once autonomous, acted to explore the poten-
tial opportunities related to the dehydration process, thus
identifying new uses for precooked dehydrated rice besides
the possibility of being filled. Naturis now operates in sever-
al business segments of the food industry, such as bakery, dry
food mix, and frozen food. Recently Naturis has started sell-
ing its products directly to the end-user.“Risò” was launched
on the consumer market in 2002: it is the first rice that can
be prepared by just resting in cold water so that  rice dishes
can be prepared without heating elements or ovens.
After 1996, despite the end of its CV project, Riso Gallo
seemed to be more entrepreneurially oriented than ever
before.While completing and refining existing product lines,
Riso Gallo developed a wide range of new products in the
years following the end of the Naturis project, continuing to
act in a very entrepreneurial way. “Risottate,” an innovative
risotto that can be cooked in the pan instead of being boiled,
was launched in 2000. A year later Riso Gallo introduced
“Arancini Siciliani,” frozen fried rice balls. In 2004 Riso Gallo
launched “Risotto Expresso,” a risotto that takes 2 minutes to
cook in the pan or in the microwave oven.
All these new businesses were created within Riso Gallo
itself, without leveraging on its CV project any longer.
Compared to the past, Riso Gallo’s  EO appeared greatly
enhanced. This was witnessed by a few organizational
changes introduced in the second half of the 1990s. Above
all, Riso Gallo put its key employees in positions to better
detect opportunities, rewarding them adequately. In particu-
lar,Riso Gallo established an R&D department in 1996, led by
the former production manager and composed of six techni-
cians totally dedicated to the research and development of
new products.The R&D department was put at the heart of
the company to be responsible for the future development of
Riso Gallo. Human and financial resources are now allocated
daily to projects of new business creation.The research input
usually comes from the sales and marketing (S&M) depart-
ment that identifies a customer problem or need.This is then
passed to the R&D department,where a project leader is cho-
sen from among the six researchers and a research team is
built to find a technically feasible solution. During this phase
the R&D team sometimes works with university partners
and/or private research centers. Then, all the other depart-
ments are called on to evaluate the solutions proposed by the
R&D department during meetings of the so-called “new prod-
uct development committee.”This committee means that the
process of new product development is iterative among
departments, so that any new business is an expression of the
entire company.
The creation of the R&D department was not the only
organizational change enacted by Riso Gallo. In 1996 the
S&M department was divided into two parts and the two
sons of Mario Preve were appointed to the management:
Carlo to the Italian S&M department, while Riccardo to the
overseas S&M department
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In 1997, a more integrative communication system was
adopted: a virtual knowledge area where information and
data could be shared. Departments can now communicate
faster and better, sharing files in real time, thus favoring
knowledge sharing for faster opportunity recognition and for
overcoming the problems related to its exploitation. Also
starting in 1997, the remuneration system has been based on
the capacity of employees to create value: employees are
rewarded (up to the 20% more) for developing new ideas
presented to the S&M department.
A greater integration among organizational departments
has been developed as well. In 1999, the so-called “integra-
tion committee” was established to allow departments to
interface better. Top managers of the different departments
meet every two weeks to share ideas, problems, and experi-
ences.The top management recognizes the need for a more
intensive knowledge exchange to generate new business
ideas better and faster.
All these changes did not lead the company to become
more formalized, as can happen in growing firms. The top
management recognized that formalization could obstruct
the development of new business ideas. At the same time
room was left for decentralization: the split of the S&M
department into two different departments, the entrance of
Mario Preve’s sons to the management team, the establish-
ment of the R&D departments, and the participation of every
department in the R&D process bear witness to this concern.
Decentralization was pursued on the basis of the assumption
that it allows the most knowledgeable people to help the
firm to innovate and anticipate future customer needs.
Findings and Conclusions
The case study analysis can be summarized as represented
in Figure 1, where arrows express a positive relationship
between concepts.
Before 1988, a low level of new business creation charac-
terized Riso Gallo, since only two innovations were intro-
duced in 112 years on the basis of imitative practices.This was
due to a low level of EO: the company’s strategic orientation
appeared to be more conservative than entrepreneurial.
During the second period, given the need to face the evi-
dent maturity of the rice industry and the low level of Riso
Gallo’s EO, the company deliberately decided to set up a CV
project (i.e.,Naturis) to create new businesses. In eight years,
a new  business was developed thanks to the entrepreneur-
ial efforts of Naturis.
In the third period the company was no longer character-
ized by the presence of a CV project,but its level of new busi-
ness creation still remained high, with three new products
introduced in 10 years. This was due to the fact that Riso
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Gallo developed a high level of EO.We argue that the CV proj-
ect played a strong role in developing the EO of Riso Gallo
thus pushing the company toward future business creations
and being a point of reference for changing strategic orienta-
tion. Mario Preve became aware of the need to be entrepre-
neurially oriented during the second period and then, during
the third period, gradually developed Riso Gallo’s EO, learn-
ing from Naturis how to be more entrepreneurial.He pushed
his company toward an organizational learning process that
allowed Riso Gallo to develop new knowledge, thus chang-
ing strategic orientation.
This learning process can be defined “experimental,”since it
occurred within the corporate context and generated distinc-
tive knowledge.It differs greatly from “acquisitive”learning,that
takes place when the firm gains access to and subsequently
internalizes preexisting knowledge from its environment
(Zahra, Nielsen, and Bogner 1999). Competitive advantages
evolving from experimental learning tend to be more sustain-
able than those generated from acquisitive learning (Lei, Hitt,
and Bettis 1996). The result of this learning process was the
development of integrative knowledge, which is related to the
way a company  combines its resources and capabilities to cre-
ate value. It differs from technical  knowledge, which is con-
cerned with insights about the properties of specific activities
and is needed for new business creation in the short run (Kogut
and Zander 1992).Technical knowledge is related to products,
while integrative knowledge is related to organization. Riso
Gallo learned how to shape its activities to further integrate its
resources and competencies in novel ways. The learning
process was not only related to the R&D activities, but encom-
passed the entire organization in terms of structure and mech-
anisms, afterwards oriented to new business creation.
We believe that much of the success of the above-men-
tioned learning process was also due to the fact that the par-
ent company was a family business and that the leadership of
its CV was given to a family member. The relationship
between Riso Gallo and Naturis was more intense and regu-
lar than in other CV cases, given that the relationship
between the two brothers, Mario and Cesare, was more
intense and regular than that between other CEOs. This
means that Riso Gallo could have observed the managing
practices in Naturis in a closer way, catching every single ele-
ment of the entrepreneurial management of its CV project
that made it so innovative, proactive, and risk taking. The
close relationship between Mario and Cesare led Mario to
spend much time in Naturis, having contact with Naturis
managers and researchers, learning in detail what being
entrepreneurially oriented means. Moreover, giving  Cesare
the possibility of expressing his entrepreneurial spirit in
Naturis led Mario to acknowledge the importance of being
entrepreneurial and to see how to do it.
We believe that the “family model” of this CV project
solved the trade-off between CV operative autonomy and
control: Naturis received the autonomy needed to work on
its new business creation project with positive results, but
Riso Gallo was able to informally monitor its CV having total
access to Naturis’ organizational climate and procedures.
Case study results can be then generalized toward theory
building.As Figure 2 shows, the main effect of CV consists in
developing new business creation in established companies
whose EO is low.This effect comes from a deliberate learning
process oriented to the development of technical knowl-
edge. Nevertheless, CV could also have a collateral effect, not
identified in literature, consisting in ensuring future business
creation through a positive impact on the parent company’s
EO.This second effect is difficult to detect, since it is not evi-
dent in the short run. Moreover, it is unexpected and—differ-
ently from the main one—it is emergent.The collateral effect
comes from an experimental learning process that leads the
company to develop new integrative knowledge.
This emergent effect reshapes the relationship between
strategy and structure in CE processes. So far, CV has been
seen as a deliberate strategic choice oriented toward busi-
ness creation through the foundation of a new organization-
al unit. On the basis of the results of the present case study,
organizational change can lead strategic orientation to
change, through a mimicking process that induces the parent
company to learn from its CV project.
We also argue that a CV project, as in the above-presented
case, could be used as an effective way to cope with a perva-
sive force in organization (i.e., momentum). Miller and
Friesen (1980) have shown the presence of this force, which
means that past practices, trends, and strategies tend to keep
evolving in the same direction.A CV project, as in the case of
Riso Gallo,can be adopted as a way to stop the administrative
momentum and restart, thanks to a new business creation, a
new strategic direction guided by entrepreneurship.
This study has explored the effects of a CV project on new
business creation, finding that CV can sustain new business
creation even after its end, through a positive influence on
the parent company’s EO.This influence is provided by the
activation of an experimental learning process that leads to
the development of integrative knowledge. We have shown
that CV could foster new business creation more than
expected not only directly in the short run, but also indirect-
ly in the long run.Thus the effect of CVs on new business cre-
ation after their end is collateral (since it is not the main
one), emergent (since it is not deliberate), and indirect (since
it comes through a positive impact on EO).
Using the metaphor of the “heart” introduced above, CV
appears to be not just a “by-pass,” but also a “medicine” able
to bring the “heart” back to functioning. In the Riso Gallo
case, Naturis helped the “heart” to “beat” again  autonomous-
ly; that is, it made Riso Gallo become more entrepreneurial.
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This article contributes to the development of the firm-
level entrepreneurship field, since it studies a phenomenon
beyond the usual time span and identifies a new relationship
between two core concepts in the research field: EO and CV.
Despite extensive research on CV processes, scholars have
not investigated the effects of CV projects on new business
creation after their end, overlooking the possibility that CVs
could play a role in reinforcing the EO of parent companies.
At the same time, this study attempts to shed some light on
one of the emerging issues in CE: the relationship between
CE,organizational learning,and knowledge (Dess et al.2003).
We argue that CV can activate a short-term learning process
resulting in the development of technical knowledge, but
also a long-term learning process consisting in developing
integrative knowledge.
Moreover, the present study opens a new line of research in
firm-level entrepreneurship, given that such a relationship
between EO and CV has not been even identified before. On
the one hand, theoretical research could explore the condi-
tions in which such a relationship exists or not, as well as
investigating those factors that moderate the relationship
itself. On the other hand, future empirical research on these
topics may assess the proposed conceptual relationship in
the empirical domain.To this end, further in-depth case stud-
ies may allow us to further refine the proposed relationship,
while survey studies may develop and test hypotheses from
our suggestion. Further empirical evidence will help the
development of practical fallouts for managers to use CV
projects not just to overcome low levels of EO but also to
restart the entrepreneurial momentum and foster EO for new
business creation.
EO
New Business
Creation
CV
Main Effect
Collateral Effect
Development of
integrative knowledge
Development of
technical knowledge
Figure 2. Effects of Corporate Venturing on New Business Creation and
Entrepreneurial Orientation as Learning Processes (Personal Elaboration) 
ain Effect
Collateral Effect
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